Is Uber really to blame? - Why the FAZ views the taxi crisis as too one-sided.

The diagnosis sounds plausible at first. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung describes the crisis of the German taxi industry as the result of a profound societal change. Fewer business trips, fewer visits to pubs, more home office, more streaming, weak economic growth and the Deutschlandticket. All of that is true. And yet the article “Taxi crisis in Germany: Is Uber really to blame?” ➚ leaves a sour aftertaste. Because although the authors cite numerous reasons for the difficult situation of the industry, the platform operators surprisingly often fall into the role of misunderstood modernizers, while the taxi trade appears as a nostalgic loser. The reality, however, is considerably more complex.

First, one must give the FAZ credit on an important point: The taxi industry has not only since the market entry of Uber, Bolt and other platforms been fighting declining demand. The figures speak a clear language. Business trips have permanently changed since the COVID-19 pandemic. Video conferences replace many on-site meetings. The traditional taxi business at train stations, airports and hotels is no longer as reliable as it used to be.

Societal changes are real as well. Those who go out less, travel less, and stay home more often order taxis less often. The notion that Uber alone is responsible for all the problems is therefore too simplistic.

But precisely at this point the FAZ article's weakness begins. It describes the structural problems in detail, while the effects of the platform model are treated with remarkably restrained consideration. For the crucial question is not whether Uber alone is to blame. The crucial question is how strongly platform companies exacerbate the already difficult market conditions. It is exactly here that the piece remains remarkably superficial.

Systematic legal violations by the platforms

For years courts, authorities and investigative bodies have documented violations in the rental car market. Time and again it concerns disregarding the return-to-base obligation, fake self-employment, social security fraud, undeclared work, or constructions with subcontractors that seem economically unsustainable. Numerous proceedings in German cities have shown that parts of the platform market are not cheaper because they operate more efficiently, but because rules are circumvented or costs are shifted onto employees.

Whoever ignores this reality is telling only half the story.

When taxi operators meet tariff regulations, organize shift plans, pay social security contributions, take care of patient transports and have to be available around the clock, while competitors operate under clearly lower cost structures, there is no fair competition. Then a market emerges in which those who abide by the rules come under pressure. The FAZ quotes the managing director of the Federal Association, Michael Oppermann, as saying:

“More-vehicle operators cannot do that, because they must pay the minimum wage. That’s why they are going down to their knees one after another.”

This sentence describes a central conflict of the industry. In the article, however, it is portrayed more as the position of an interest group than as a pointer to a possibly structural problem. Instead, voices that question regulation in general receive considerably more room.

This is particularly evident with Thomas Mohnke, the operator of Safedriver and Germany partner of Uber. Mohnke calls minimum transport fees, taxi tariffs and concession limits “DDR instruments.” That is a notably polemical term for regulations that were originally created to ensure nationwide mobility.

Taxi tariffs are not “central planning”!

Whoever calls taxi tariffs a relic of state central planning ignores why they exist in the first place. Taxis are not ordinary consumer goods. They perform public tasks. They stand at the station at night, take seniors to the doctor, serve rural regions and handle patient transports. Many of these services are economically viable only because the system as a whole remains stable. The push for deregulation sounds attractive as long as one only considers the lucrative rides. It becomes harder with the less profitable assignments.

What is also noticeable is how uncritically the FAZ treats Mohnke's role. The man whose company took over the Frankfurt taxi dispatch center and whose business model directly benefits from a weakening of traditional taxi structures is allowed to present his future vision almost unchallenged.

“Consumers have long ago voted with their feet,” says Mohnke.

That sounds like a law of nature of a market economy. In fact, this statement fails to note that consumers often react to prices whose creation they cannot even assess. If a platform artificially discounts a ride, accepts investor losses, or shifts costs onto subcontractors, the customer does not decide between two equally valuable offers.

They decide between different economic realities. The argument becomes even more problematic in the discussion about autonomous vehicles. Mohnke sees robotaxis as the future and explains that a large part of traffic will in the future be handled without a driver. That may happen in the long term. But the history of mobility teaches that technical feasibility and economic reality are rarely aligned.

Robotaxis will not be in regular operation on the road for a long time

Particularly in Europe autonomous fleets still face enormous regulatory, technical, and societal challenges. The notion that traditional taxi companies should now see their future primarily as premium-service providers alongside robotaxis therefore appears less as an analysis and more as a business plan.